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Abstract 
Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets 
are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the 
distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across 
markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is 
concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private 
information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’ 
private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss 
the implications of our findings for understanding the potential consequences of lowering the cost 
of information on the informational efficiency of markets.  
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1. Introduction 
Markets are essential to well-functioning societies. Yet, the debate regarding the efficiency of 
markets is still rampant. To shed light on this conundrum, we study whether differences in the 
structure of information between markets can account for the differences in their informational 
efficiency. In particular, we posit that the concentration of private information across market 
participants is a key determinant of the informational efficiency of a market.  
Because it is impossible to clearly assess the informational efficiency of markets with archival 
data (Fama, 1991), we make the methodological choice to rely upon experimental markets. A 
growing number of studies have demonstrated the unique benefits of the experimental method in 
allowing researchers to control and thus clearly identify the extent to which private information is 
captured by market prices (e.g., Bossaerts, 2009; Frydman et al. 2014; Noussair and Tucker, 2014). 
We extend the seminal work by Plott and Sunder (1988) where they find that with a complete 
set of Arrow Debreu spanning securities markets are efficient information gatherers.  The structure 
of their environment provides a particular insight into how information is quickly and efficiently 
transmitted in the market. With spanning markets, one-half of the traders are fully informed in all 
but one of the markets. Thus, these markets are populated by competing insiders who will reveal 
the states that cannot occur thus making the true asset value transparent to all traders. 
We build on this work to assess whether the presence of insiders is indeed the driving force 
leading markets to aggregate private information. We consider market experiments in which the 
asset can take one of three possible values. In our markets, traders can either be uninformed, 
partially informed or fully informed. The uninformed trader only knows the prior distribution of 
the three possible asset values. The partially informed trader is given one private signal regarding 
the value (out of the three possible ones) the asset will not take. The fully informed trader knows 
with certainty the value the asset will assume at the end of the market. If markets are 
informationally efficient then prices should reflect all the available private information regardless 
of the distribution of private information (Fama, 1970). It follows that the presence or absence of 
fully informed traders will not affect prices as long as the aggregate information of all traders in 
the market is complete. 
To derive conjectures regarding the informational efficiency of our experimental markets, we 
rely on a learning model following the work of Friedman (1991) and Copeland and Friedman 
(1987; 1991). We extend their approach to the case in which a proportion of the traders may be 
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boundedly rational. Following the work of Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015; 2018) on the 
cognitive underpinnings of trading in experimental markets, we assume traders to be either 
reflective, in which case they properly apply Bayes’ rule to infer the true asset value from market 
orders,1 or non-reflective in which case they exclusively rely on their private information to value 
the asset. Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015) show that the distinction between reflective and 
non-reflective traders is crucial for understanding the informational efficiency of markets. This 
distinction echoes previous research in Finance regarding people’s limited capacity to learn others’ 
private information from prices (e.g., see Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2018).  
Using model-based simulations, we establish several conjectures regarding the informational 
efficiency of markets and learning dynamics. Keeping the number of private signals constant 
across markets, the simulations indicate that informational efficiency should be higher in markets 
populated by both fully informed and uninformed traders than in markets solely populated by 
partially informed traders. Our simulations show that uninformed or partially informed traders 
learn the true asset value substantially faster when fully informed traders are present in the market. 
Intuitively, orders involving fully informed traders carry substantially more information than 
orders involving partially informed traders thus facilitating Bayesian inference and the 
transmission of private information into prices. Fully informed traders provide a clear signal of the 
asset’s price relative to its true value as they follow a riskless strategy of buying (selling) when the 
price is below (above) the true value.2 Our simulations also predict that the efficiency of markets 
will increase and trading volumes will decrease as the number of fully informed traders rises. 
Finally, our simulations also deliver a point prediction according to which a market populated with 
at least three fully informed traders should reach a higher level of informational efficiency than a 
market populated entirely by partially informed traders. 
Our experimental findings provide clear-cut support for our conjectures including our point 
prediction. Our experimental results also support our model by showing that markets populated by 
a higher number of reflective traders (assessed using the cognitive reflection test, Frederick, 2005) 
reach higher levels of informational efficiency.  
                                                            
1 We define the term “market order” to include bids, asks, and contract prices rather than to distinguish between limit 
orders and immediately executable orders.  As such, throughout the manuscript this term includes not only transaction 
prices but also “limit orders”. 
2 Unlike the works of Hanson, Oprea and Porter (2006) and Veiga and Vorsatz (2010), our simulated traders do not 
engage in strategic manipulations of the market. 
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2. Contribution to previous literature 
Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Our findings show that the distribution of private information has a significant effect on the 
informational efficiency of the market. This may explain why some markets have been found to be 
informationally efficient whereas others have not (e.g., Fama, 2008).3 Future research should assess 
whether there is, at least, some correlational evidence between the presence of insiders in stock 
markets and their informational efficiency. Our study can thus be seen as a starting point for 
reconciling the seemingly contradictory pieces of evidence fueling the debate between classical and 
behavioral finance. 
Because our findings are based on experimental markets, we are able to identify the causal effect 
of the distribution of information on the informational efficiency of markets thus making our 
findings immune to the usual data-mining critique (e.g., Fama, 2008). We have isolated the 
distribution of private information as a systematic factor influencing the informational efficiency of 
markets. 
Models of Informational Efficiency 
Our experimental data are consistent with the predictions of our learning model thus providing 
further support for the work of Friedman (1991) which stressed the need for a simplification of the 
modeling of continuous double auctions settings to abstract away from game-theoretic 
dimensions.4 
At the same time, our findings are also compatible with the implications of the noisy rational 
expectation equilibrium (NREE) models (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980; 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1981; Brennan and Cao, 1996) regarding ‘signal amplification’ and the 
fact that prices do not perfectly reflect the true asset value (see Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard, 
2013). It is worth noting that our learning model shares an important feature with NREE models 
as it considers two types of traders who differ in their level of sophistication. In both models, one 
type of trader fails to learn from asset prices whereas the other type of trader uses Bayesian 
updating. Our model differs, however, from NREE as non-reflective traders use their private 
information and thus do not randomly submit orders. More importantly, our approach differs from 
                                                            
3 See also the dialogue between Eugene Fama and Richard Thaler: 
http://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2016/video/are-markets-efficient 
4 In continuous double auctions, traders can submit, at any time, offers to buy or sell the asset. Traders can also accept 
current offers to buy or sell an asset. 
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NREE in its aim of modeling a continuous double auction market that mimics the experimental 
markets which we subsequently use to test our main conjectures. We thus trade off the strategic 
concerns inherent to the equilibrium approach with the applicability of our model to the complex 
environment of continuous double auctions.5 Because our ultimate goal is to test our conjectures 
in a laboratory setting, we identify our two different types of traders using simple cognitive tests. 
This is achieved by establishing a direct correspondence between the two types of traders and a 
specific cognitive skill (in our case we consider cognitive reflection as measured by the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, Frederick, 2005). This link between traders’ types and cognitive reflection has 
previously been established by Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015; 2018). Because noise traders 
in NREE are typically introduced for convenience in order to prevent the application of the no-
trade theorem, they are treated as a ‘black box’. Our research can thus be seen as an attempt to 
open the ‘black box’ and provide a cognitive profile for these traders so as to assess the extent to 
which they populate actual market settings. 
Experimental Finance 
Lab and field experiments on information aggregation have mainly focused on institutional aspects 
of informational efficiency (e.g., Plott, Wit and Yang, 2003). For example, the work of Plott and 
Sunder (1988) led to the idea that information aggregation was more easily achieved in markets in 
which a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities was available. In Plott and Sunder (1988) Arrow-
Debreu securities markets, the traded asset had a positive value only if one of three possible states 
occurred. It follows that traders receiving a signal that a given state cannot occur become de facto 
fully informed that the Arrow-Debreu security associated with that state is worthless. They can thus 
sell that security to secure a profit at no risk. Thus, in the Plott and Sunder (1988) setting, Arrow-
Debreu securities transform a market in which traders are originally partially informed into a market 
in which half of the traders are fully informed and half are uninformed. Our findings shed light on 
Plott and Sunder’s (1982, 1988) results that Arrow-Debreu securities facilitate the aggregation of 
information because these securities create markets in which some traders are fully informed and 
private information is less dispersed.6 
                                                            
5 Trying to do both at the same time has had limited success (see e.g., Cason and Friedman, 1996 for a discussion). 
6 Our work also relates to a strand of the literature that focuses on other institutional features of markets such as the 
existence of, as well as the level of competition between, market makers (Cason, 2000; Krahnen and Weber, 1999, 
2001), the existence of dark markets (Asparouhova and Bossaerts, 2017) and the presence of futures markets 
(Friedman, Harrison and Salmon, 1984). 
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Our work directly relates to a number of studies which have assessed the effect of the timing of 
information release on the informational efficiency of markets. Copeland and Friedman (1987), as 
well as Barner, Feri and Plott, (2005), have extended the original experiments of Plott and Sunder 
(1982) to different structures of information including sequential information release. Their findings 
generally suggest that the sequential arrival of information tends to hamper informational efficiency. 
Also, asset markets in which traders make sequential decisions and in which traders’ decision times 
are random have been found to generate information cascades in which some private information 
fails to be transmitted to prices (Nöth and Weber, 2003).7 
The complexity of the informational structure has also been found to affect the informational 
efficiency of markets. Plott, Wit and Yang (2003) find that information aggregation is less 
pronounced in settings in which pooling all private traders’ information does not unveil the true asset 
value with certainty. In addition to aggregate uncertainty, Camerer and Weigelt (1991) show that the 
nature of the private signals plays an important role in the informational efficiency of markets. The 
authors show that private information may fail to aggregate in cases in which traders do not know 
with certainty whether half the market is composed of insiders. O’Brien and Srivastava (1991) find 
that asset prices do not converge to fundamentals in an environment with multiple assets in which 
asset valuation can depend upon a previous realization of dividends. 
In line with previous research, our model and our experimental data show that market complexity, 
whether it arises from the complexity of the information structure or other institutional features, is a 
crucial ingredient to understanding the informational efficiency of markets. 
Finally, our paper largely builds on the work of Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard (2013) who 
compare the informational efficiency of markets populated with different numbers of fully informed 
traders. They find evidence for ‘signal amplification’ as prices tended to reflect the true value more 
closely as the number of fully informed traders in the market increased. In addition to replicating 
their findings for markets populated with fully informed traders, we extend their work by comparing 
the informational efficiency of market environments that only differ in the dispersion of information. 
                                                            
7 Other works have focused on the presence of manipulators who could distort prices and hamper the informational 
efficiency of the market (Hanson, Oprea and Porter, 2006; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2009, 2010). Hanson, Oprea and Porter 
(2006) incentivized manipulators to distort market prices but find that they were ultimately unable to affect informational 
efficiency. Veiga and Vorsatz (2009, 2010) used computerized market manipulators and showed that these operators 
could distort asset prices. 
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In doing so, we show, using both a learning model and experimental markets, that concentrating 
private information tends to promote informational efficiency.  
3. Model and conjectures 
Following Friedman (1991), our model assumes that traders do not strategically place orders. We 
thus posit an intermediate level of sophistication in the modeling of agents interacting in a continuous 
double auction setting. At the lower end of the sophistication spectrum is the zero-intelligence model 
of Gode and Sunder (1993) which only constrains traders’ behavior to avoid trading at a loss. In this 
model, traders do not update their beliefs regarding the true asset value in contrast to Friedman 
(1991). At the upper end of the sophistication spectrum are the game-theoretic double auction 
models in which traders are assumed to behave strategically (e.g., Wilson, 1987). However, these 
models have been found to underperform less sophisticated models in explaining traders’ behavior 
in double auction market experiments (e.g., Cason and Friedman, 1996). Based on the current state 
of the literature we thus employ a modeling approach similar to Friedman (1991) as such models 
have been found to be the most successful in explaining experimental data. In this setting, traders 
establish their beliefs regarding the true asset value based on observed market orders. Traders then 
follow a reservation-price strategy that consists of buying (selling) the asset whenever the price is 
below (above) their belief of the true asset value. 
3.1. Model 
3.1.1. Trading and information 
Even though we present our model for the specific parameters used in our experiments (see 
Section 4 for the experimental design), it is important to note that our findings apply more 
generally. In Section 5.3.1, we stress test the model by assessing the robustness of our conjectures 
to different distributions of the asset value. We also consider the robustness of our findings to 
different cash and shares endowments as well as to the case of markets populated by a larger 
number of traders. 
Our model allows for a market populated with traders possessing different levels of private 
information. Depending on the market design, traders can be either uninformed, partially informed 
or fully informed. In particular, we take the parameters of Market 9 from Plott and Sunder (1988) 
as our baseline. This market is populated by 12 partially informed traders who receive the same 
endowment of cash (1,200) and shares (4). The asset value can only take one of three possible 
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values: 50, 240 or 490 with probabilities 35%, 45% and 20%, respectively.8 Half of the partially 
informed traders receive one private signal regarding which possible value the asset could not take 
(e.g., “Not 50”) whereas the other half of the partially informed traders receive the other possible 
signal (e.g., “Not 240”) so that the aggregate information available to traders in the market was 
complete. Building on this market design, we then consider the case in which the market is 
populated by both uninformed and fully informed traders (see e.g., Plott and Sunder, 1982, or 
Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard, 2013). An uninformed trader does not receive a private signal, 
while a fully informed trader receives two different signals (e.g., “Not 50”; “Not 240”) thus making 
the true asset value (e.g., 490) clear. 
 One caveat of the market design we employ is that the asset value is the same for all traders 
implying no gains from trade and thus no trade in a rational expectation equilibrium. Our approach 
thus focuses on the informational efficiency of markets rather than on the allocative efficiency of 
markets. We made this choice purposefully as we intend to first consider a setting in which 
information aggregation had been evidenced (Treatment C in Plott and Sunder, 1988) rather than 
considering the case in which gains from trade exist but information aggregation failed to be 
observed (Treatment A in Plott and Sunder, 1988). Notwithstanding, the conjectures derived from 
our model simulations appear to be robust to all treatments and all specifications used in Plott and 
Sunder (1988) including markets in which gains from exchange exist (see Section 5.3.1). Finally, 
while the no trade theorem may technically apply to our market design, the extensive literature in 
experimental markets shows that trade does indeed occur even in the absence of gains from trade 
(e.g., Palan, 2013; Noussair and Tucker, 2014). One possible reason for this is the existence of 
noise (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) or boundedly rational traders (e.g., Friedman, 1991; 
Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Peng and Xiong, 2006; Esponda, 2008; Eyster and Rabin, 2005; 
Mondria, 2010; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015; Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp, 2016; Vives and Yang, 2017; Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2018) who fail to 
immediately infer others’ private information from prices.9 
                                                            
8 The other two specifications (Markets 7 and 8) by Plott and Sunder (1988) used in this treatment are almost identical. 
These markets are such that the probabilities of occurrence of each of the three possible values are the same. Market 
7 uses the same three values as Market 9 (50, 240 and 490) whereas Market 8 uses values 125, 375 and 525. The 
authors did not report any differences across these markets. Importantly, the conjectures we derive from our 
simulations are robust to alternate specifications (see Section 5.3.1). 
9 Risk-sharing motives may also be a reason to trade in our markets if all private information is not captured in the 
price in which case no risk remains. 
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Our model reproduces the decentralized continuous double auction mechanism used in the 
experimental markets.10 At the beginning of each market, a trader (selected at random) posts a bid-
ask spread. A second trader is then selected and given the option to either accept the current bid or 
ask or improve the bid-ask spread.11,12 Traders (selected at random) continue to improve the bid-ask 
spread until a trade occurs.13 If a trade occurs, then the price, 𝑝𝑝, is set at the current best bid (or ask) 
and the trading book is updated.14  
The decision to improve the bid-ask spread or trade depends on a trader’s belief regarding the 
true asset value. Specifically, a trader will improve the current bid-ask spread if her belief lies 
within the current spread. In that case, the updated bid (ask) will be drawn from a uniform 
distribution between the current bid (ask) and the trader’s belief. If traders’ beliefs are below 
(above) the current best bid (ask), then they would sell (buy) the asset. This trading strategy can 
be seen as an example of a reservation-price strategy (see Friedman, 1991). In our model, the 
reservation-price strategy consists of trading according to a trader’s current belief of the true asset 
value. While this strategy can only be justified if we assume risk neutrality for the traders, this 
assumption is widely used in double auction models (see Copeland and Friedman, 1987; Friedman, 
1991) as well as in game-theoretic microstructure models (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 
1985).15     
Similar to our experimental design, trading follows a bid-ask improvement rule. In our market 
environment, traders observe market prices as well as bids and asks. We thus assume that traders 
can use all market orders (bids, asks and contract prices) to update their beliefs. 
3.1.2. Reflective and non-reflective traders 
                                                            
10 A market maker (or a specialist) is commonly utilized in the market microstructure literature (e.g., Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). In order to mimic our experimental design as closely as possible we do 
not include a market maker in our model. 
11 A bid-ask spread is only updated when the newly selected trader has enough cash (shares) to cover the bid (ask) 
position. In line with our experimental markets, traders are not permitted to sell short or borrow funds. Moreover, 
when a trader is selected to act, the trader first removes any bids or asks from the order book that are inconsistent with 
the trader’s current belief of the asset value. For example, if the trader previously submitted a bit that is now greater 
than her current belief, then this bid is automatically canceled. Note that traders in our experimental markets also had 
the ability to cancel orders. 
12 Our model differs from Friedman (1991) as the randomly selected trader is forced to act, if possible. Thus, the trader 
cannot choose to not act in an attempt to gain better terms of trade.  
13 The sequence of trades is not random, however. Traders either will or will not trade at a given bid-ask spread 
depending upon their current belief regarding the true asset value. 
14 The accepted bid/ask is removed from the book, and the next best bid/ask, if one exists, becomes the current best 
bid/ask. We thus consider the case of an open book similar to our experimental design (see Section 4).  
15 The zero-intelligence model of Gode and Sunder (1993) also disregards issues related to risk attitudes. 
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Even though current learning models in which all traders use Bayes’ rule have had some success 
in explaining data in experimental markets with double auctions, they still ‘leave much to be desired’ 
(Cason and Friedman, 1996, page 1332). The authors point to a promising direction (page 1333) by 
stating: “Given that the most ‘rational’ of available models did not perform especially well on its 
‘home turf’, perhaps the most appropriate next step is to explore new models that incorporate 
significant bounded rationality.” Following this suggestion, we populate our market with traders 
who fail to apply Bayes’ rule to learn from market orders.16 We consider a model in which 
heterogeneous agents interact in the market. In particular, we assume our traders to be either 
reflective or non-reflective. Reflective traders apply Bayes’ rule to infer the true asset value as they 
observe market orders. We use the term reflective for these traders as the failure to use Bayes’ rule 
to update beliefs on the face of new information has been closely connected to ones’ cognitive 
reflection capacity (e.g., Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009; Campitelli and Labollita, 2010; 
Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011; Lesage, Navarrete and De Neys, 2013; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 
2011, 2014; Sirota, Juanchich and Hagmayer, 2014; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015, 2018) as 
measured by Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (henceforth, CRT).  
Non-reflective traders only update their beliefs once, on the basis of their private information, and 
do not use market data to infer other traders’ private information. These identifying characteristics 
are consistent with several important models in the literature: the Walrasian model (Lintner, 1969), 
the no revelation of expectations model (Copeland and Friedman, 1987; 1991), models stressing 
investors’ inattention and information processing costs (e.g., Peng and Xiong, 2006; Mondria, 2010; 
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2016; Vives and Yang, 2017), the behavioral 
equilibrium model (Esponda, 2008) and the cursed equilibrium model (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; 
Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2018). 
                                                            
16 This can be seen as being inspired from quasi-Bayesian learning models such as Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Rabin (2002). Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) account for stock market 
under- and over-reaction to news by developing a model in which traders overvalue the precision of their private 
information and update their beliefs self-servingly by downplaying information which may not be consistent with their 
prior beliefs. Rabin (2002) considers the case in which investors assign too much weight to small samples to account 
for stock market under- and over-reaction to news. Both Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Rabin 
(2002) build their models on extensive cognitive psychology literature showing that people largely fail to apply Bayes’ 
rule suffering instead from a number of common and long-lasting biases (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Stanovich, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).  
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According to the Walrasian and the no revelation of expectations models, traders make decisions 
based on their private information and fail to infer other traders’ information from market prices.17 
The behavior of traders in these models as well as in models of investors’ inattention closely relates 
to the widely-documented phenomenon of the winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; 
Thaler, 1988, 1991). The winner’s curse occurs when auction participants fail to anticipate the 
informational content of other individuals’ bids and end up paying too much for the auctioned item. 
Applied to financial markets, Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2018) refer to those who “neglect the 
informational content of prices” as cursed traders. 
3.1.3. Learning 
In our model, learning occurs after each market event. Market events either correspond to an 
improvement of the bid-ask spread or to a transaction. Based on these market events, reflective 
traders can update their beliefs regarding the true asset value by applying Bayes’ rule to infer other 
traders’ private information. Each event corresponds to one of the following actions: (1) best bid 
is accepted; (2) best ask is accepted; or (3) the bid-ask spread is improved. Let 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝜂𝜂  represent the 
belief of trader 𝑗𝑗 of type 𝜂𝜂 after event 𝑛𝑛, which is denoted by {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}. Trader types, 𝜂𝜂 = 𝜏𝜏 × 𝑠𝑠, 
identify whether the trader is reflective or not (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅 or 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅) as well as the signal the trader 
received (𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 50,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 240 or 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 490 for partially informed traders and 𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼 or 𝑈𝑈 for 
informed or uninformed traders). 
Reflective traders update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule with 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {50,240,490} as follows: 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�=∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 �𝑣𝑣 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 𝑖𝑖 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠  represents the prior belief of the trader with the signal “𝑠𝑠” and 𝑣𝑣 is the true asset 
value.18  
In Appendix B, we detail the Bayesian learning procedure to calculate 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 for each of the three 
possible types of events. We then use these detailed procedures to simulate our model. 
 
3.1.4. Model example 
                                                            
17 It is important to note that the two models differ because traders are myopic in the Walrasian model whereas they 
trade based on equilibrium prices in the no revelation of expectations model. 
18 Note that informed reflective traders do not update their belief as they already know the true asset value. 
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To illustrate the intuition behind the model’s learning mechanism, consider the following simple 
example.  Suppose the true asset value is 490. Also, assume all traders are reflective and that this 
assumption is commonly known by all traders.  The fully informed traders know the true asset value, 
i.e. 𝜇𝜇0
𝑅𝑅,𝐼𝐼 = 490, while the uninformed traders’ belief of the asset value is 𝜇𝜇0𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 223.5 (= 0.35 ×50 + 0.45 × 240 + 0.20 × 490). Consider the following market events. 
First market event: bid-ask spread improvement: 200-360 
The initial event is always an improvement of the bid-ask spread because the book is empty. This 
is equivalent to assuming that the initial bid-ask spread is 50-490, i.e. the minimum-maximum 
possible value of the asset. The fully informed traders do not update their beliefs; however, the 
uninformed reflective traders must update their belief regarding the likelihood of occurrence of each 
of the three values of the asset by determining the probability of occurrence of the first market event 
given the asset value is either 50, 240 or 490. If the true value was 50 or 490, then this new bid-ask 
pair (200-360) could only have been submitted by another uninformed trader. Indeed, since traders 
follow a reservation price strategy based upon their belief, if the true value is 50 (490), then fully 
informed traders could not submit a bid (ask) above (below) 50 (490). If the true value was 240, then 
any trader could have generated this first event. Thus, while the uninformed reflective traders revise 
their initial belief of 223.5, they do not significantly alter it based upon this event, i.e. 𝜇𝜇1
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 218.7. 
Second market event: trade at 360 
A trader can only accept the current best ask if their belief is greater than the ask value. This implies 
that this ask must have been accepted by an informed trader with the belief of 490 because 
uninformed reflective traders hold a belief of 218.7. Thus, the uninformed reflective trader learns 
from the second market event that the true asset value is 490. 
This example illustrates how quickly uninformed reflective traders can learn in the presence of 
fully informed traders. In the absence of fully informed traders in the market, uninformed reflective 
traders could not have determined the true asset value as early as the second market event. Inclusion 
of non-reflective traders will tend to slow this process down as non-reflective uninformed traders 
will stick to their initial belief of 223.5 thus preventing reflective traders to learn any private 
information from the market orders submitted by these non-reflective traders. 
 
3.2. Conjectures  
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We conduct simulations of the learning model to derive a series of conjectures that can be tested 
experimentally. Each simulation is conducted with the same number of traders (12), and the same 
endowment of cash (1,200 francs) and shares (4) used in the original setting of Plott and Sunder 
(1988) which will be the basis for our experiments (see Section 5.3.1 for robustness checks with 
different parameter values). A total of 25,000 simulations were run for (each of the) various 
combinations of two exogenous model parameters. The first parameter corresponds to the asset value 
𝑣𝑣 ∈ {50, 240, 490}. The second parameter is the proportion of reflective traders (𝛼𝛼 ∈  {0, 1
12
, 2
12
, 
3
12
, … ,1}) in the market which we assume to be common information known by all traders. Each 
simulation runs until 30 trades have been executed so as to achieve a trading volume comparable to 
experimental markets using a similar design (see Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2018).19 
Our first conjecture compares informational efficiency in markets that differ in the relative 
number of partially informed, fully informed and uninformed traders. However, we hold the 
number of private signals in each market constant. Thus, we are able to compare, for example, a 
market with 12 partially informed traders (each endowed with one signal) to a market with 6 fully 
informed (each endowed with two signals) and 6 uninformed (not endowed with a signal) traders. 
Our simulations show that markets populated by both fully informed and uninformed traders are 
more informationally efficient than markets solely populated by partially informed traders. To 
show this, we measure the informational efficiency of a market by calculating the absolute distance 
between a market price and the true asset value for each transaction in a given simulation. We then 
take the mean of this measure over a given simulation. Averaging this mean value across all 25,000 
simulations yields the mean absolute deviation (MAD) for a given distribution of private 
information. In Figure 1, we compare MAD values between a market populated by 100% (50%) 
partially informed traders with a market populated by 50% (25%) fully informed traders and the 
rest uninformed traders.20 In both comparisons, the number of private signals is identical between 
the market with partially informed traders and the market with fully informed traders. We observe 
that informational efficiency, which is inversely related to MAD values, is highest in markets with 
fully informed traders compared to markets with partially informed traders. 
                                                            
19 Our results are, however, robust to different stopping rules including stopping a simulation after either 5 or 60 
transactions (results available upon request from the authors). 
20 We will follow this naming convention for the remainder of the manuscript. That is, if the title of a specific 
simulation or experimental treatment does not explicitly identify all traders, then it is assumed that the unnamed traders 
are uninformed. 
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Figure 1 also shows, in line with our model, that the informational efficiency of markets 
increases (MAD values decrease) as the proportion of reflective traders in the market increases. 
 
 
Figure 1. These figures represent the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value in 
simulated markets. In the left panel, we compare a market populated by 100% partially informed 
traders and a market populated by 50% fully informed traders. In both markets, the number of private 
signals is identical and equal to 12. In the right panel, we compare a market populated by 50% 
partially informed traders to a market populated by 25% fully informed traders. In both markets, the 
number of private signals is identical and equal to 6. MAD values are averaged across all three asset 
values, 50, 240 and 490. 
In addition, the informational efficiency is similar in the market populated by 100% partially 
informed traders (MAD = 72.8) and the market populated by only 25% fully informed traders (MAD 
= 71.4). This holds even though there are twice as many private signals in the market with partially 
informed traders (12 signals) than in the market with 25% fully informed traders (6 signals). We 
investigate this further by comparing the informational efficiency of the market in which all traders 
are partially informed with markets populated by different proportions of fully informed traders 
(with all other traders uninformed). In Figure 2, we show that a market populated by 100% partially 
informed traders is less informationally efficient than a market populated by only 25% (3 out of 12) 
fully informed traders whereas it is more efficient than a market populated by 17% (2 out of 12) fully 
informed traders. Even though the MAD values reported in Figure 2 correspond to averages across 
all possible proportions of reflective traders in the market, the ordering of the different markets holds 
for each of the possible proportions of reflective traders. It follows that the qualitative nature of 
Conjecture 1b, 1c and 1d does not hinge upon the proportion of non-reflective traders in the market.  
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Figure 2. These bar charts represent the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value 
(averaged across all possible proportions of reflective traders in the markets), for different numbers 
of partially and fully informed traders. MAD values are averaged across all three asset values, 50, 
240 and 490. 
 
Figure 2 also highlights, in line with NREE models (see Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard, 2013, 
Hypothesis 3), that the increase in the number of fully informed traders will lead to an increase in the 
informational efficiency of market prices, which is in line with the idea of ‘signal amplification’. 
Based on these simulations, we derive the following conjecture. 
Conjecture 1. (Informational Efficiency of Markets) 
a) The higher the proportion of reflective traders in the market the higher the informational 
efficiency of the market. 
b) Markets with the same number of private signals are more informationally efficient when 
signals are concentrated in the hands of fully informed traders rather than dispersed across 
partially informed traders. 
c) The higher the number of fully informed traders in a market the higher the informational 
efficiency of the market. 
d) Markets with two (three) fully informed traders should be less (more) informationally efficient 
than markets in which all traders are partially informed. 
 
Markets populated by different proportions of fully informed traders not only vary in the 
informational efficiency of prices but also in trading volumes. By construction, simulations were 
stopped after 30 transactions.21 Thus, we assess trading intensity (rather than volume) by 
                                                            
21 While the primary stopping criteria for the simulations was 30 transactions, simulations also halted if (i) 10,000 
iterations of the simulation occurred or (ii) 1,000 iterations passed without an event. One iteration of the simulation 
corresponds to the random selection of a trader and that trader’s action: improve the bid/ask spread, accept the current 
best bid or ask, or nothing. So, if the simulation randomly selected a trader who did not update the bid-ask spread or 
accept the current best bid or ask 1,000 consecutive times, then the simulation halted in order to avoid an infinite loop. 
The assumption is that (i) traders were unable to trade at this point due to a lack of cash/shares or (ii) traders beliefs’ 
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calculating the average number of transactions that occur within a block of five iterations in each 
simulation. In Figure 3, we show that trading intensity decreases as the number of fully informed 
traders in the market increases (see last four bar charts). This likely holds because, as the number 
of informed traders increases, prices move closer to the true asset value. This implies that a trader’s 
belief regarding the asset value is more likely to be aligned with other traders’ beliefs. Because the 
discrepancy in traders’ beliefs drives trading, markets in which private information is more likely 
to be aggregated generate fewer transactions.   
We also show that trading intensity is lower for markets in which all traders are partially 
informed compared to markets populated by less than 50% fully informed traders. Finally, trading 
intensity is essentially identical for the 100% partially informed market and the market populated 
by 50% fully informed traders. These findings form the basis for Conjecture 2. 
 
Figure 3. These bar charts represent trading intensity (averaged across all possible proportions of 
reflective traders in the markets, across all 25,000 simulations and across all three asset values) for 
different types of markets which differ in the number of partially and fully informed traders. Trading 
intensity is calculated as the average number of transactions completed in a market for blocks of five 
iterations of the algorithm. 
Conjecture 2. (Trading volumes) 
a) Trading intensity is lower for markets in which all traders are partially informed compared 
to markets populated by less than 50% fully informed traders. 
b) Trading intensity is the same for the 100% partially informed market and the market 
populated by 50% fully informed traders.  
c) Trading intensity decreases as the number of fully informed traders in the market increases. 
4. Experimental design 
                                                            
were close enough to the true value that they were unable to update the spread. Note that a bid-ask spread of was not 
allowed to be an empty interval. 
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To test our conjectures, we use experimental markets that have the same characteristics as those 
described in our model simulations. We consider a market setting in which subjects could trade an 
experimental asset that can only take three possible values: 50, 240 or 490 francs (each franc was 
worth $0.001) with probabilities 35%, 45% and 20%, respectively. Trading takes place using a 
computerized continuous double auction mechanism.22 We conduct a total of 5 treatments using a 
between-subject design. Treatments only vary in the distribution of private signals across traders. 
In the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment, each of the 12 traders in the market is privately 
informed of a value the asset could not take. As half of the traders were given one signal (e.g., 
“Not 50”) and the other half were given the other possible signal (e.g., “Not 240”), the aggregate 
information available to traders in the market was complete.  
We contrast the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment with four ‘fully informed’ treatments in 
which information is concentrated in the hands of a few fully informed traders with all other traders 
uninformed.23 From the point of view of the amount of aggregate information, the ‘100% partially 
informed’ treatment and the ‘fully informed’ treatments do not differ. In all cases, the aggregate 
information reveals the true asset value. To test our conjectures, we consider ‘fully informed’ 
treatments in which the number of fully informed traders is either 2, 3, 4 or 6.  
We recruited a total of 418 individuals from a subject pool of more than 1,500 individuals at a 
major Western US University. We conducted a total of 35 sessions. Ten sessions were conducted 
for both the ‘100% partially informed’ and the ‘50% fully informed’ treatments. Five sessions were 
conducted for each of the other three treatments. We conducted twice as many sessions for the first 
two treatments as they are the key treatments for the testing of our conjectures given that the total 
number of private signals (12) is the same in both markets.    
Each market was composed of 12 traders.24 In line with our model, traders were endowed with 
1,200 francs in cash and 4 shares of the asset. Each session consisted of 17 markets with independent 
draws for the asset value.25 
                                                            
22 The experiment was conducted using Zocalo which is an open-source software used for experimental markets. 
23 In the ‘fully informed’ treatments the informed traders receive two signals (e.g., if the true value is 240, then these 
traders receive the signal “Not 50” as well as the signal “Not 490”). 
24 Two sessions in the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment were conducted with 11 traders due to an elevated number of 
last-minute cancellations. 
25 We used the same draw for all sessions to facilitate comparisons across sessions. This draw corresponds to the asset 
values used in Market 9 of Plott and Sunder (1988). 
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Before the trading phase of each session started, subjects completed a training exercise regarding 
a random device (a spinning wheel) that represented the probabilistic distribution of the true asset 
value (50, 240 or 490 francs). During the training, subjects had to predict the outcome of the 
spinning wheel over 10 trials (see online Appendix O1, Instructions Part 1). Each correct 
prediction was rewarded 25 cents, and each incorrect answer incurred a 10-cent penalty. The 
instructions concluded with a comprehension quiz and took approximately 20 minutes for subjects 
to complete. Average earnings (including a $7 show-up payment) for the two and one-half hours 
experiments were equal to $48.  
At the end of all experimental sessions, we elicited demographic information and evaluated 
subjects’ level of cognitive reflection using a 7-item version of the test developed by Frederick 
(2005) (see Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014). We also collected theory of mind scores (see 
Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) (see Appendix D for a description of the survey). As is standard in the 
literature, these tests were not incentivized; however, subjects received $3 for completion of the 
survey.  
5. Experimental Results 
We test our conjectures sequentially, starting with an analysis of informational efficiency and 
then volumes. 
5.1. Informational efficiency of markets 
The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the sharp difference in asset prices between our ‘100% 
partially informed’ treatment and our ‘50% fully informed’ treatment thus providing support for 
Conjecture 1b.26 The bottom panel of Figure 4 illustrates that, in line with Conjecture 1c, prices are 
closer to the true asset values as the number of fully informed traders increases in the market.  
  
                                                            
26 In Appendix E, we show the graphs of market prices for each experimental session. 
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Figure 4. Top Panel. Average price per minute over the 10 sessions for each of the seventeen markets in 
the ‘100% partially informed’ (solid blue line with square markers) and the ‘50% fully informed’ treatments 
(dash-dot red line). Bottom Panel. Average price per minute for the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment is 
repeated along with the average price per minute over the five sessions for each of the seventeen markets 
in the ‘17% fully informed’ (solid green line with square markers), ‘25% fully informed’ (solid cyan line 
with triangle markers) and ‘33% fully informed’ (solid magenta line) treatments. The true asset value is 
denoted in parentheses at the bottom of each subfigure and is represented by a solid (black) horizontal line. 
 
We assess the statistical significance of our findings in the regression reported in Table 1. 
Coefficients of the treatment dummy variables should be interpreted as positive or negative effects 
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with respect to the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment for which we omitted the dummy variable. 
In these regressions, we use treatment dummies which take value one when a market was conducted 
under the corresponding treatment and value zero otherwise. To assess Conjecture 1a, we also 
control for the proportion of reflective traders in the market. To that end, we make use of the 
cognitive reflection test as a way to assess how reflective a trader is. An individual’s score on the 
CRT, as a measure of cognitive reflection, is a key determinant of her capacity to properly use Bayes’ 
rule (see Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015; 2018). 
We consider a trader to be reflective (non-reflective) when her score is above (below) the median 
CRT scores of all 418 subjects who participated in this study. Alternately, in regression [2] we 
control for the average CRT score of all traders in a given session.27 We also control for the true 
asset value in a given market and for the number of market periods in which the trader has 
participated (Market number variable). The negative and significant coefficient of the proportion 
of reflective traders (see regression [1]), as well as the negative and significant coefficient of the 
average trader’s CRT score in a session (see regression [2]), confirm Conjecture 1a. Indeed, both 
variables are negatively related to our measure of informational efficiency (MAD). We confirm 
Conjecture 1b because the coefficient for the Dummy ‘50% fully informed’ is negative and 
significant (see regressions [1] and [2]) showing that informational efficiency is higher when half 
of the traders receive two signals than when all traders receive only one signal. This finding is 
actually consistent with the recent results of Barreda et al. (2017) who reported, in an experimental 
setup in which private signals provide probabilistic clues for the true value of the asset, that prices 
are closer to the fundamental value when the signals are concentrated in the hands of ‘quasi-
insiders’ rather than dispersed across traders. We also find support for Conjecture 1c through 
regression [3] as the coefficient on the number of fully informed traders is negative and significant. 
Finally, we support Conjecture 1d because the coefficient for the Dummy ‘17% fully informed’ is 
positive and significant whereas the coefficient for Dummy ‘25% fully informed’ is negative and 
significant in regressions [1] and [2]. This implies that markets in which all traders are partially 
informed are more efficient than markets with two fully informed traders but less efficient than 
those with three fully informed traders. 
Table 1. Random effects panel regression of MAD values per market as a function of cognitive 
reflection and treatment dummies 
                                                            
27 In line with Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018), we also find that traders earnings are positively related to 
individual CRT scores (see Table A2 in Appendix A). 
21 
 
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. 
 
 
 
5.2. Trading volumes (Conjecture 2) 
In Figure 5, we report, in line with Conjecture 2a, that trading volumes are lower for markets 
populated by 100% partially informed traders compared to all markets in which less than 50% 
MAD All treatments Only treatments with fully informed traders 
Specification: [1] [2] [3] 
Dummy ‘17% fully informed’ 13.592*** 
(4.963) 
14.222*** 
(4.902) 
- 
Dummy ‘25% fully informed’ -14.477* 
(8.128) 
-16.158** 
(8.141) 
- 
Dummy ‘33% fully informed’ -26.636** 
(10.636) 
-26.482** 
(10.627) 
- 
Dummy ‘50% fully informed’ -66.824*** 
(7.200) 
-69.518*** 
(6.194) 
- 
Number of fully informed - - -19.237*** 
(2.223) 
Proportion of reflective traders -35.560* 
(19.802) 
- - 
Average CRT score of traders 
in a session 
- -14.910*** 
(4.443) 
- 
Market number -0.196 
(0.589) 
-0.196 
(0.589) 
-1.138 
(0.733) 
True asset value 0.131*** 
(0.027) 
0.131*** 
(0.028) 
0.128*** 
(0.0328) 
Intercept 110.824*** 
(11.762) 
137.784*** 
(16.400) 
158.024*** 
(14.869) 
Observations (sessions) 595 (35) 595 (35) 425 (25) 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.186 0.190 0.198 
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fully informed traders were present. In line with Conjecture 2b, trading volumes appear to be 
similar between markets populated by 100% partially informed traders and markets populated by 
50% fully informed traders. By contrast with Conjecture 2c, trading volumes do not linearly 
decrease in the number of fully informed traders because markets with 33% fully informed traders 
exhibit unexpectedly high volumes. However, trading volumes are lower for markets with 50% 
fully informed traders compared to markets with only 17%, 25% or 33% fully informed traders. 
 
Figure 5. These bar charts represent trading volumes for different types of markets which differ in the 
number of partially and fully informed traders. 
In Table 2, we replicate the analysis of Table 1 with trading volumes as the dependent variable. 
In regressions [1] and [2], coefficients of the treatment dummy variables should be interpreted as 
positive or negative effects with respect to the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment for which we 
omitted the dummy variable. In regression [4], all treatment dummy variables are omitted with the 
exception of the one corresponding to the ‘33% fully informed’ treatment. We find support for 
Conjecture 2a, because the coefficient for the Dummies ‘17% fully informed’, ‘25% fully informed’ 
and ‘33% fully informed’ are all positive (see regressions [1] and [2]). These coefficients are also 
statistically significant with the exception of the Dummy ‘25% fully informed’. In line with 
Conjecture 2b, the coefficient for the Dummy ‘50% fully informed’ is either non-significant (see 
regression [1]) or negative and marginally significant (see regression [2], p-value = 0.088). We 
find mixed support for Conjecture 2c. In regression [3] the coefficient for the number of fully 
informed traders in a market is negatively and significantly associated with trading volumes, which 
supports Conjecture 2c. However, given Figure 5, we further explored this issue with regression 
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[4].  Here we see that trading volumes are higher in markets with ‘33% fully informed’ traders 
compared to all the other markets which is at odds with Conjecture 2c. 
Table 2. Random effects panel regression of trading volumes per market as a function of 
cognitive reflection and treatment dummies 
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. 
  
Trading volumes 
All treatments Only treatments with fully informed traders 
Specification: [1] [2]  [3] [4] 
Dummy ‘17% fully 
informed’ 
9.380** 
(3.993) 
11.173*** 
(4.228) 
 - - 
Dummy ‘25% fully 
informed’ 
9.286 
(6.809) 
7.114 
(6.427) 
 - - 
Dummy ‘33% fully 
informed’ 
28.514*** 
(7.884) 
26.112*** 
(7.614) 
 - 25.644*** 
(7.841) 
Dummy ‘50% fully 
informed’ 
-6.324 
(4.623) 
-7.099* 
(4.153) 
 - - 
Number of fully informed - -  -4.482*** 
(1.589) 
- 
Proportion of reflective 
traders 
-29.792** 
(13.996) 
-  - - 
Average CRT score of 
traders in a session 
- -9.150*** 
(3.066) 
 - - 
Market number -1.418*** 
(0.187) 
-1.418*** 
(0.187) 
 -1.589*** 
(0.216) 
-1.589*** 
(0.216) 
True asset value -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
 -0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
Intercept 52.134*** 
(4.208) 
70.537*** 
(9.160) 
 74.984 
(7.186) 
51.031*** 
(3.977) 
Observations (sessions) 595 (35) 595 (35)  425 (25) 425 (25) 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
R² 0.432 0.466  0.244 0.353 
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5.3. Robustness checks 
5.3.1. Simulation results for alternative specifications 
Although we presented our model for the specific parameters used in our experiments, our findings 
apply more generally. In Appendix C, we stress test the model by assessing the robustness of our 
main conjecture (1b) according to which markets with the same number of private signals are more 
informationally efficient when signals are concentrated in the hands of fully informed traders rather 
than dispersed across partially informed traders. We test whether this conjecture holds for different 
distributions of the asset value, different cash and share endowments, and for markets populated by 
a larger number of traders.  
One limitation of our current market setup is that it does not allow traders to mutually gain from 
exchange. To address this, we conducted simulations for markets in which traders were assigned 
different values for the asset. Thus, mutual gains from exchange can be realized when high-value 
traders buy shares from low-value traders. In Appendix C, we report simulation results showing that 
allocative efficiency in markets in which traders can mutually gain from exchange is higher when 
private information is concentrated in the hands of fully informed traders rather than dispersed across 
partially informed traders (see Figure C1). These simulation results thus extend Conjecture 1b.  
5.3.2. Mixing partially and fully informed traders 
We have shown thus far that our experimental findings are largely consistent with the predictions 
of our model. As a robustness test, we ran an additional experiment in which we mixed partially 
and fully informed traders. In particular, we consider the case in which the market is populated by 
33% (4 out of 12) fully informed, 25% (3 out of 12) partially informed and 42% (5 out of 12) 
uninformed traders (‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’). For such a market, our model 
simulations predict an average MAD value of 50.78, which is less than the MAD of 59.67 for the 
case of 33% fully informed traders and greater than the MAD of 32.55 for the case of 50% fully 
informed traders. That is, our model predicts that the level of informational efficiency will only be 
slightly improved by adding three partially informed traders to a market populated by four fully 
informed traders. In addition, the informational efficiency of the ‘33% fully informed / 25% 
partially informed’ treatment is expected to be lower than for the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment. 
Our experimental results confirm our model predictions as the informational efficiency of the ‘33% 
fully informed / 25% partially informed’ treatment is found to be lower than the informational 
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efficiency of the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment, while being only slightly (but not significantly) 
higher than the ‘33% fully informed’ treatment (see Table A1 in Appendix A). 
As a final consistency check, we confirm a basic prediction of our model according to which 
reflective traders systematically earn more than non-reflective traders (see Table A2 in Appendix 
A and Appendix B2). These findings are in line with the previous results of Noussair, Tucker and 
Xu (2014), Corgnet et al. (2015) and Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018). 
6. Conclusion 
What elements of the market institution have the ability to enhance its informational efficiency? 
We examine one aspect of the question by building on prior experimental designs to develop an 
asset market environment in which the distribution of private information is analyzed. 
We derived conjectures based on a learning model with heterogenous agents. In our model, 
traders differ in their ability to apply Bayes’ rule to infer private information from market orders. 
We define traders as being either reflective or non-reflective depending on whether they use 
Bayesian updating or not. Our model shows that, for the same level of aggregate information in a 
market, informational efficiency is substantially higher when private information is concentrated 
in the hands of a few fully informed traders than when private information is widely dispersed. Our 
model also allowed us to test a point prediction according to which markets populated by three 
fully informed traders would be more informationally efficient than markets populated solely by 
partially informed traders. We confirm these conjectures by comparing the informational 
efficiency of experimental asset markets in a series of treatments that only differed in the 
distribution of private information. Because we collected data on traders’ cognitive reflection 
scores, we were also able to show that, in line with our learning model, markets with a higher 
proportion of reflective traders achieved a higher level of informational efficiency. Finally, we 
largely confirmed our conjecture that trading volumes should be lower in markets in which the 
informational efficiency is predicted to be higher. 
Our findings help reconcile different views regarding the informational efficiency of markets by 
showing that the extent of the transmission of private information to asset prices crucially hinges 
on the distribution of information in the market. Our results suggest that markets in which 
information is concentrated in the hands of insiders are more likely to achieve strong-form 
efficiency than markets in which this is not the case. This implies the level of informational 
efficiency might substantially differ across markets and industries. Future research should 
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investigate further the inability of markets to aggregate highly fragmented information because, as 
Hayek (1945, page 520) puts it, the ultimate economic problem considers the “utilization of 
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality”. 
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Appendix A. Additional analyses 
We present two robustness checks in this appendix.  First, Table A1 shows that adding three partially 
informed traders to a market populated by four fully informed traders only has a slight impact on the 
informational efficiency of the market (see the coefficient of the ‘33% fully informed’ dummy 
variable). Moreover, these markets with seven (partially and fully) informed traders do not perform 
as well as (with respect to informational efficiency) as markets with six fully informed traders (see 
the coefficient of the ‘50% fully informed’). This result holds even when controlling for participants’ 
CRT scores via the Proportion of reflective traders variable or the Average CRT score variable. 
Table A1. Random effects panel regression of MAD values per market as a function of cognitive 
reflection and treatment dummies 
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. 
 
In Table A2, we present our second robustness check which demonstrates that reflective traders 
earn more than non-reflective traders when pooling all treatments together (see the positive 
coefficient for CRT score). The CRT score is calculated as the number of correct answers of a 
MAD Treatments ‘33% fully informed’, ‘50% fully informed’ and 
‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’ 
Specification: [1] [2] [3] 
Dummy ‘33% fully 
informed’ 
3.541 
(12.279) 
0.785 
(12.618) 
4.696 
(12.139) 
Dummy ‘50% fully 
informed’ 
-37.472*** 
(8.997) 
-43.038*** 
(8.102) 
-38.910*** 
(9.354) 
Proportion of reflective 
traders 
-34.650 
(38.228) 
- - 
Average CRT score  in a 
session 
- -19.559** 
(8.115) 
- 
Market number -2.545*** 
(0.732) 
-2.541*** 
(0.732) 
-2.544*** 
(0.731) 
True asset value 0.136*** 
(0.032) 
0.136*** 
(0.032) 
0.136*** 
(0.032) 
Intercept 103.166*** 
(18.016) 
139.563*** 
(16.400) 
88.725*** 
(11.909) 
Observations (sessions) 340 (20) 340 (20) 340 (20) 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.173 0.183 0.169 
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given trader on the CRT. We also control for theory of mind scores, using the eye gaze test (Baron-
Cohen et al. 1997), to assess subjects’ capacity to infer other’s intentions. In this task, participants 
looked at images of people’s eyes and had to choose one of four feelings that best described the 
mental state of the person whose eyes were shown. Our theory of mind score is defined as the 
number of correct answers to the 36 question, 10-minute test. In line with Bruguier, Quartz and 
Bossaerts (2010) and De Martino et al. (2013), Hefti et al. (2016), Corgnet et al. (2018) we find a 
positive relationship between trader’s performance and theory of mind scores. We refer to Signal 
“Not x” Dummies as dummy variables set to 1 for subjects who received the signal “Not x”. The 
“Two signals Dummy” is set to 1 for subjects who received two signals and are thus fully informed. 
The Top 25% Reflective Dummy and Top 25% Theory of Mind Dummy variables are set to one 
if the participant scored in the top 25% of all participants in this study (across all 35 experimental 
sessions) on the CRT or the Theory of Mind Eye Gaze test, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
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Table A2. Random effects panel regression of trader earnings as a function of cognitive 
reflection and information held by traders 
Market earnings (in francs) All treatments 
  [1] [2] 
Top 25% Reflective Dummy 100.004*** 
(27.009) - 
CRT score - 32.774*** (6.337) 
Top 25% Theory of Mind Dummy 50.917* (26.543) - 
Theory of Mind score 
- 4.414* (2.720) 
Gender Dummy  
(1 if male) 
69.424*** 
(25.477) 
60.507** 
(25.078) 
Market number 0.609 
(1.438) 
0.628 
(1.438) 
True asset value 3.977*** 
(0.075) 
3.977*** 
(0.075) 
Signal “Not 50” Dummy 142.048*** 
(41.064) 
146.514*** 
(40.635) 
Signal “Not 240” Dummy -96.761** 
(41.620) 
-93.721** 
(41.058) 
Signal “Not 490” Dummy 151.921*** 
(28.964) 
155.379*** 
(28.443) 
Two signals Dummy 246.405*** 
(14.683) 
246.742*** 
(14.693) 
Intercept 1,039.539*** 
(31.723) 
890.062*** 
(81.832) 
Observations 6,511 6,511 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 
R² 0.660 0.662 
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the trader level in parentheses. Note that the 
number of observations is lower than the total number of participants times the number of markets (7,106) because we did not collect 
theory of mind scores for three sessions in the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment. 
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Appendix B. Model conjectures 
B1. The model 
B1.1. Model description 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the model presented in Section 3.  It is based 
upon Appendix G in Corgnet et al. (2015) and has been modified to account for informed and 
uninformed traders rather than partially informed traders.  We assume there are two types, 𝜏𝜏, of 
traders.  Reflective traders (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅) utilize market orders (bids, asks and contract prices) to update 
their beliefs of the asset’s value, while non-reflective traders (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅) do not update their initial 
beliefs. A market order implies an update of the bid-ask spread or a transaction.  Each order 
corresponds to one of the following events: (1) best bid is accepted; (2) best ask is accepted; or (3) 
the bid-ask spread is updated. 
Traders will either be informed (i.e., know the true asset value with certainty), 𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼, or 
uninformed (i.e., only know the possible asset values along with their probabilities), 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈.28  We 
thus have four possible trader types: 𝜂𝜂 = (𝜏𝜏, 𝑠𝑠) where 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅,𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅} and s ∊ {U, I}. Let 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝜂𝜂 represent 
the belief of a trader of type 𝜂𝜂 after event 𝑛𝑛, which is denoted by {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}.  Uninformed reflective 
traders update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule with 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {50,240,490} as follows: 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�=∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 �𝑣𝑣 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 𝑖𝑖 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈  represents their prior belief and 𝑣𝑣 represents the asset value. 
This trader updates her belief according to the following formula: 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣 = 50|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 50 + 𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣 = 240|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 240 + 𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣 = 490|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 , {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�× 490 = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃50(𝑛𝑛 − 1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] × 50 + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃240(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] × 240+ 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃490(𝑛𝑛 − 1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] × 490 
where  
                                                            
28 The variable 𝑠𝑠 represents the informational type of the trader. In the case of partially informed traders, 𝑠𝑠 identifies 
the signal received by the trader, i.e. “Not 50”, “Not 240” or “Not 490”. 
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𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃50(𝑛𝑛 − 1) + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃240(𝑛𝑛 − 1) +
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃490(𝑛𝑛 − 1). 
After the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 event, the uninformed reflective trader believes that the probability the true 
asset value is 𝑣𝑣 is given by 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 (𝑛𝑛 − 1). 
The term, 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣], i.e. the probability that event 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) occurred given the asset’s true value 
is 𝑣𝑣, must be calculated.  The derivation of this term is dependent upon the type of event as well 
as the region in which the event occurred. The set of possible prices is the interval 50 through 490 
on the real number line, as we restrict bids and asks to this interval which corresponds to lowest 
(highest) possible asset value. We subdivide this interval into several subintervals, called regions, 
which are delineated by the traders’ beliefs along with the overall interval’s endpoints, 50 and 490. 
Suppose the uninformed reflective trader believes the asset value is 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈  = 130.  As part of the 
learning process, this trader must determine the likelihood of event 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) occurring assuming the 
true asset value is 50, 240 or 490.  Suppose this trader assumes the true asset value is 240.  Then 
this trader assumes that all informed traders know the asset value is 240, while any uninformed 
non-reflective traders hold their initial belief of 223.5.29  In this scenario the interval [50,490] 
would be divided into 4 regions: [50,130], [130,223.5], [223.5,240], and [240,490]. 
Now this trader will update her belief based upon the probability of a particular event occurring 
with a particular region. And, this probability is based upon the likelihood of the different traders 
acting in each region. Recall that traders submit offers to buy below their belief and offers to sell 
above their belief. So, if a reflective trader observes a new offer to buy at 225, then she knows this 
could only have been submitted by a fully informed trader with a belief of 240. Let 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) 
represent the current best bid (ask) when 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) occurs, while 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛) represents the improved bid 
(ask) corresponding to 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛).30  We denote the region in which an event occurred by 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟, where 𝑃𝑃 ∈{𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛}  If 𝑃𝑃 = 50 (240) [490] and the trader assumes the asset value is 50 (240) [490], 
then region, 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟, will consist of the single point, 50 (240) [490] because the informed traders’ belief 
coincides with 𝑃𝑃. 
We consider the following three cases characterized by event type. 
                                                            
29 Note that the initial beliefs of reflective and non-reflective traders with the same clue are identical. 
30 Note that 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) may not correspond to the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 bid (ask).  Rather, the subscript corresponds to the event 
number.  Suppose, for example, that the order book contains bids of 75 and 100.  The current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, would 
be 100.  Further, suppose 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) corresponds to a trader accepting the 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 = 100.  Thus, the new current best bid 
would be 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 = 75. 
36 
 
Case 1: the current best bid is traded, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}: = {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)} 
Suppose event 𝑛𝑛 corresponds to the acceptance of the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1.  Then the 
conditional probability that event {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)} occurred, i.e. the current best bid 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 was traded, 
given the true asset value is 𝑣𝑣, is  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1   
where 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1  represents the probability that a trader is willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, i.e. the 
region in which the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, resides.  
To calculate the probability of selling in region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 we consider the beliefs of four possible 
trader types: informed reflective traders, informed non-reflective traders, uninformed reflective 
traders, and uninformed non-reflective traders.31  Suppose 𝑣𝑣 = 50 in the above equation.  This 
implies that the beliefs of the informed reflective and informed non-reflective traders are 50.  The 
belief of the uninformed non-reflective traders is 223.5.  The probability that a trader is willing to 
sell in 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 is 𝜒𝜒
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 × 𝛼𝛼/2 + 𝜒𝜒𝜏𝜏,𝐼𝐼 × 1/2 + 𝜒𝜒𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 × (1 − 𝛼𝛼)/2, where 𝜒𝜒𝜏𝜏,𝑠𝑠 is one if the trader’s 
belief is less than or equal to the lower bound of the corresponding region (𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1) and zero 
otherwise.  That is, the uninformed reflective trader calculates the proportion of traders holding a 
belief less than or equal to the current best bid. The exogenous parameter 𝛼𝛼 represents the actual 
proportion of reflective traders in the market.32 The proportion of (un)informed non-reflective 
traders is represented by (1 − 𝛼𝛼). 
Case 2: the current best ask is traded, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}: = {𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)} 
Suppose the current best ask, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, is accepted.  Then the conditional probability that event {𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)} occurred, i.e. the current best ask 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 was traded, given the true value of the asset is 
𝑣𝑣, is:  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1   
where 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1  represents the probability that a trader is willing to buy in region 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1. 
                                                            
31 The informed reflective and informed non-reflective types could be consolidated into a single group as neither type 
will update its belief given it knows the actual value. 
32 Reflective traders assume that other reflective traders share their belief of the proportion of reflective traders in the 
market. It is possible that reflective traders’ belief of the proportion of reflective traders in the market is not accurate. 
If this proportion is not common information known by all traders, then Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015) consider 
the situation in which this proportion is not common information known by all traders. They show this assumption 
impacts both the simulation, as well as the experimental, results. 
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In this case we determine whether the beliefs of the four different types of traders (η) is greater 
than or equal to the upper bound of the region and add 𝛼𝛼/2 ([1 − 𝛼𝛼]/2) to 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , i.e. we check 
if their belief is greater than or equal to the current best ask. 
Case 3: both the current best bid and ask are improved, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}: = {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )⋂NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} 
Suppose neither the current best bid nor the current best ask is traded.  Then both the bid and the 
ask are updated from the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, and ask, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, to the new (improved) best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛, 
and ask, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛.  Then the conditional probability that event {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)} = {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )⋂NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} 
occurred, i.e. both the current best bid and the best ask were “not traded” (NT), given the true value 
of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, is: 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) ∩ NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1]= 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1]                                                         [𝑖𝑖]× 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]                                     [𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]× 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛  ∩  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�                                     [𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] 
Consider each term in this product separately. 
[i] The first term is equivalent to one minus the probability that the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, was not 
traded.  This is equal to one minus the probability that traders are willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1.  
Thus, we have: 
𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1] =  �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�. 
[ii] The second term may be rewritten as:  
𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )] = 1 − 𝑃𝑃[T(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]= 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1|𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�= 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1|𝑣𝑣,𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�× 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�  = 1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1/𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1  
where we make use of Bayes’ rule as well as the fact that since 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 must lie to the right of (or 
possibly coincide with) 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 on the number line, 
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1|𝑣𝑣, 𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� = 1. 
[iii] Finally, the third term may be expressed as: 
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𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛  ⋂ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� = 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�  × 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�
= � 𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝜂𝜂 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1) �𝜂𝜂 �
× � 𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(490, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝜂𝜂 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛� �𝜂𝜂 � 
where the sums are taken over the four trader types, 𝜂𝜂 = (𝜏𝜏, 𝑠𝑠): informed reflective traders, 
informed non-reflective traders, uninformed reflective traders, and uninformed non-reflective 
traders.  As the true value is assumed to be 𝑣𝑣, it is also assumed that the informed traders believe 
the true asset value is 𝑣𝑣 in these calculations. In addition, 𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 (𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟) represents the upper (lower) bound 
of the region 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟, 𝑃𝑃 ∈ {𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛}. The variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to 𝛼𝛼 for reflective trader types and (1 − 𝛼𝛼) for non-reflective trader types.33  
Thus, we have:  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1� × �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1
𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1
� × � 𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝜂𝜂 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1) �𝜂𝜂 �
× � 𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ,𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1𝜂𝜂 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛� �𝜂𝜂 � 
when the 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠ℎ event is an improvement to the bid-ask spread.34  
B1.2. Model example 
We demonstrate the learning model by providing an illustrative example. Suppose there are six 
informed traders and four reflective traders, i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = 4/12.  For simplicity, assume two of the 
reflective traders are informed and two are uninformed.  Let the true value of the asset be 50. 
Based on their prior information uninformed traders’ initial belief of the true asset value (prior 
to the occurrence of any event) is 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 0.35 × 50 + 0.45 × 240 + 0.20 × 490 =
                                                            
33 When running the simulations described in Section B2, traders are first designated as either informed or uninformed.  
Next, the reflective traders are randomly identified.  For example, if 𝛼𝛼 = 5/12, then five traders would randomly be 
identified as reflective with the remaining seven identified as non-reflective.  Thus, it is possible that the number of 
reflective traders is not evenly distributed across the informed and uninformed types.  However, this more closely 
resembles the laboratory environment. 
34 Strictly speaking, there exist cases in which only the bid or the ask is improved.  However, we assume traders do 
not update their beliefs on these unlikely events.  These cases occur, for example, when a trader wants to update both 
the bid and the ask, but does not have the requisite amount of cash/shares to cover the updated bid/ask as well as any 
outstanding bids/asks the trader might have. 
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223.5.  Informed traders’ initial belief is 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝐼𝐼 = 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅,𝐼𝐼 = 490.  The informed traders will not update 
their belief of the asset value, while the uninformed reflective traders will.  And, while the 
uninformed reflective traders know that informed traders exist, they do not know their belief as 
they do not know the true asset value.  Thus, throughout the updating process, when these traders 
calculate the probability of an event occurring given the value (50, 240, 490), they must assume 
that the informed traders’ belief coincides with the assumed asset value.  
First market event: bid-ask spread {180, 360} 
We consider the uninformed reflective traders.  Suppose the first trader submits an initial bid and 
ask spread of {𝑏𝑏1 = 180,𝑎𝑎1 = 360}.  The uninformed reflective traders will update their belief to 
227.3 by applying the following Bayesian formula: 
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃50(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]  50 + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃240(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]  240+ 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃490(𝑛𝑛 − 1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]  490 
where n would be one and 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃50(𝑛𝑛 − 1) × 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] ×
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃240(𝑛𝑛 − 1) + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃490(𝑛𝑛 − 1).  The initial prior probabilities are 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃50(0) = 0.35, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃240(0) = 0.45 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃490(0) = 0.20, respectively. 
It remains to calculate 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣] for 𝑣𝑣 ∈ {50,240,490}.  This probability is equal to the 
probability that neither the current best bid nor the current best ask was traded given the value 𝑣𝑣.35  
In this case the probability of the {180, 360} bid-ask pair is equal to the following: 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{NT(𝑏𝑏0 ) ∩ NT(𝑎𝑎0 )} |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 ,𝑎𝑎0] = 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏0 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0] × 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎0 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0, NT(𝑏𝑏0 )] × 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ∩ 𝑎𝑎1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0�            = 𝑃𝑃[ 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏0|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0]  × 𝑃𝑃[𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎0 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0, 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏0]  × 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1  ⋂ 𝑎𝑎1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1�𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0�     (1) 
where the default initial bid, 𝑏𝑏0, is set to 50 and the default ask, 𝑎𝑎0, is 490.  𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 represent 
the regions in which the new bid (180) and new ask (360) reside.  We assume all bids and asks, 
and hence prices, reside in the interval [50,490].  This interval is then divided into regions 
determined by the traders’ beliefs as depicted in Figure B1.   
 
                                                            
35 As previously noted in Section B1.1, this probability is equal to the product of three terms: (1) probability that the 
bid was not accepted given the value 𝑣𝑣, (2) probability that the ask was not accepted given the value 𝑣𝑣 and the event 
that the bid was not traded and (3) probability that the new bid and ask lie in their respective regions. 
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Figure B1.  Representation of traders’ initial beliefs, the first bid-ask improvement event, and the 
regions in which the new bid and ask exist.  Note that reflective and non-reflective traders hold the 
same initial beliefs.  Moreover, the regions, 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1, depend upon the assumed true asset 
value. 
In words, the probability of the bid-ask improvement given the true value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣 is 
equal to the product of the following terms: 
[i]   The probability that the new bid improves the old bid given the value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, and 
given the old bid-ask pair. 
[ii]  The probability that the new ask improves the old ask given the value, 𝑣𝑣, the old bid-ask pair (𝑏𝑏0,𝑎𝑎0), and that the new bid improves the old bid. 
[iii] The probability that the new bid resides in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] and the new ask is in 
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [223.5,490] given the value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣 = 50 or 490, and given the old bid-ask 
pair.  If the asset value is assumed to be 240, then these regions would be 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] 
and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [240,490]. 
We address each term in the product in order.  Assume the true value is 50 (240) {490}.  The 
term [i] is equivalent to one minus the probability that a bid in the region [50,50] ([50,223.5]) 
{[50,223.5]} was accepted/traded, i.e., one minus the probability of a trader selling in this region, 
�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1�.  If the value is assumed to be 50, then this region consists of a single point in which 
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only informed traders would transact.  If the value is assumed to be 240 or 490, then no traders 
would trade in this region as their beliefs would be greater than the upper bound of the region.  
Thus, reflective traders assess this probability to be 0.5 (0) {0}, which makes this first term equal 
to 0.5 (1) {1}. 
The term [ii] is equivalent to one minus the ratio of the probability that a trader buys in the region 
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 to the probability that a trader buys in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0, i.e. 1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0/𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 .  If the asset value is 
assumed to be 50, then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 = [50,50] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 = [223.5,490] and the probability of buying in 
each region is 1 and 0, respectively.  Indeed, all informed traders would buy in the first region, 
while no traders would buy in the second region as all traders’ beliefs would be less than the lower 
bound of the region.  If the asset value is assumed to be 240, then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 = [50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 =[240,490] and the probability of buying in each region is 1 and 0, respectively.  If the asset value 
is assumed to be 490, then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 = [50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 = [490,490] and the probability of buying 
in each region is 1 and 0.5 (again, all informed traders), respectively.  Thus, this second term is 
equal to 1 (1) {0.5} given the trader assumes the true value to be 50 (240) {490}. 
Finally, the term [iii] consists of a product of two sums.  The first sum is the probability of a 
trader buying in the region containing the new bid, which is equivalent to the probability that a 
trader would submit a bid in that region (i.e., her belief is greater than the upper bound of the 
region).  The second sum, the probability of a trader selling in the region containing the new ask 
given the new bid, is calculated in the same manner (i.e., her belief is less than the lower bound of 
the region).  The term [iii] is calculated as follows: 
�
𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ,𝑎𝑎0� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ,𝑏𝑏0�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛�𝜇𝜇0𝜂𝜂 ,𝑎𝑎0� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏0) �𝜂𝜂 � × � 𝛾𝛾2�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 ,𝑎𝑎0� − 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑏𝑏1�𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛(490,𝑎𝑎0) −𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇0𝜂𝜂 , 𝑏𝑏1� �𝜂𝜂 � 
where 𝜂𝜂 =( 𝜏𝜏, 𝑠𝑠) with 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅,𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅} and 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐼𝐼,𝑈𝑈}.  If the trader type being considered involves 
reflective (non-reflective) traders, then the variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to 𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) (i.e., 𝛾𝛾 = 1
3
 for this 
example). 
To calculate this third term, the trader must account for the beliefs of all four trader types: 
uninformed reflective, uninformed non-reflective, informed reflective and informed non-reflective.  
Suppose the trader assumes the true asset value is 50.  Then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 =[223.5,490].  This trader then assumes all informed traders hold the belief of 50, while all 
uninformed traders hold the belief of 223.5.  Note that in this case only uninformed traders could 
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have submitted a bid of 180.  Thus, the two types of informed traders would be excluded from the 
first sum in this third term.  Moreover, as the initial beliefs of reflective and non-reflective traders 
are identical, we may combine the terms for these types (𝛾𝛾
2
+ (1−𝛾𝛾)
2
= 4/12
2
+ 8/12
2
= 1
2
) to yield:  
�
12 �223.5 − 50223.5 − 50�� × �12 �490 − 223.5490 − 223.5� + 12 �490 − 223.5490 − 180 ��. 
The probability that this first event occurred given the true asset value is 50 is therefore given by 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] = 0.5 × 1 × �12 �223.5 − 50223.5 − 50�� × �12 �490 − 223.5490 − 223.5� + 12 �490 − 223.5490 − 180 �� = 0.23. 
Next, suppose the uninformed reflective trader assumes the true asset value is 240.  Then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 =[50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [240,490].  The 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 region differs from the case in which the trader 
assumes the value is 50 because the trader now believes that informed traders hold the belief of 
240.  Note that any trader could have submitted this bid-ask combination.  Thus, this third term is 
given by (where we again combine the reflective and non-reflective types given their common 
initial beliefs): 
�
12 �223.5 − 50223.5 − 50� + 12 �223.5 − 50240 − 50 �� × �12 � 490 − 240490 − 223.5� + 12 �490 − 240490 − 240��. 
The probability that this first event occurred given the true asset value is 240 is therefore given by 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]= 1 × 1 × �12 �223.5 − 50223.5 − 50� + 12 �223.5 − 50240 − 50 �� × �12 � 490 − 240490 − 223.5� + 12 �490 − 240490 − 240��= 0.93. 
Finally, suppose the uninformed trader assumes the true asset value is 490.  Then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 =[50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [223.5,490].  Note that in this case only uninformed traders holding the 
belief of 223.5 could submit the ask of 360 as informed traders hold the belief of 490.  Thus, this 
third term is given by: 
�
12 �223.5 − 50223.5 − 50� + 12 �223.5 − 50490 − 50 �� × �12 �490 − 223.5490 − 223.5��. 
The probability that this first event occurred given the true asset value is 490 is therefore given by 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] = 1 × 0.5 × �12 �223.5 − 50223.5 − 50� + 12 �223.5 − 50490 − 50 �� × �12 �490 − 223.5490 − 223.5�� = 0.17. 
Note that 0.23 × 0.35 + 0.93 × 0.45 + 0.17 × 0.20 = 0.533.  Then, after observing this first 
event, the uninformed reflective traders update their belief of the true asset value to: 
𝜇𝜇1
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 0.23 × 0.350.533 × 50 + 0.93 × 0.450.533 × 240 + 0.17 × 0.200.533 × 490 = 227.3 
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Recall that the uninformed non-reflective traders, as well as the informed traders do, not update 
their beliefs.  Figure B2 shows the traders’ beliefs after this first event. 
Second market event: sale at 180 
To conclude this descriptive example, suppose the bid of 180 is accepted by the second randomly 
selected trader.  The uninformed non-reflective trader updates her belief based upon this event by 
first calculating the probability of this event occurring given the asset value is 50, 240 or 490, 
respectively.  That is, this trader calculates the probability that a given trader would be willing to 
sell in region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] given the true asset value is 50, 240 or 490, respectively.  Note 
that this is region is the same for each assumed asset value (see Figure B2).  Suppose the asset 
value is assumed to be 50.  Then, only the informed traders would be willing to sell in this region.  
Thus, we have 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = 1/2 
as one-half (six) of the traders are informed (two are reflective and four are non-reflective). 
If the uninformed non-reflective trader assumes the true asset value is 240, then no trader would 
be willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] as each trader would hold a belief greater than 
the upper bound of this region.  Indeed, given the assumption that the true asset value is 240, 
informed traders would believe the asset value is 240.  And, uninformed reflective traders believe 
the asset value is 227.3, while uninformed non-reflective traders believe the asset value is 223.5.  
Thus,  
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = 0. 
Similarly, if the uninformed non-reflective trader assumes the true asset value is 490, then no 
trader would be willing to sell in the region  𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] as, again, each trader would hold a 
belief greater than the upper bound of this region.  Thus, 
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = 0. 
The uninformed non-reflective trader therefore updates her belief according to the formula 
𝜇𝜇2,𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃50(1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}]  50 + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃240(1)𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}]  240+ 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃490(1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}]  490 
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𝜇𝜇2
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 1/2 × 0.231/2 × 0.23  50 + 0 × 0.931/2 × 0.23  240 + 0 × 0.171/2 × 0.23  490 = 50. 
Thus, the uninformed non-reflective trader learns that the true asset value is 50.  The new current 
best bid would be set to 50 (by default), while the current best ask remains 360.  This is the case 
because, as in the experiment, we do not clear the order book after a transaction.  The simulation 
would continue with the random selection of a third trader. 
 
Figure B2.  Representation of traders’ updated beliefs after the first event, the trade at a price of 
180 (the second event), and the region in which the accepted bid exists.  Note that reflective 
informed and non-reflective informed traders hold the same belief, while reflective uninformed and 
non-reflective uninformed traders hold different beliefs.  While the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 will typically 
depend upon the assumed true asset value, in this example the region is identical for each assumed 
value. 
 
B2. Earnings comparison between reflective and non-reflective traders 
As described in Section 3.2 we ran simulations of the model to develop testable conjectures. In 
this section we show that the earnings of reflective traders exceed those of non-reflective traders 
in markets populated by 50% fully informed traders as well as in markets populated by 100% 
partially informed traders. 
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For each combination (𝑣𝑣,𝛼𝛼) with 𝛼𝛼 ∈ {1/12, 2/12, … ,1} we execute 25,000 simulations. Each 
simulation is conducted as follows: a randomly selected trader either accepts the current best bid 
(ask) or strictly improves the bid-ask spread.36 Note that any of this trader’s outstanding bids or 
asks that do not agree with her current belief (i.e., bids above or asks below her belief) are canceled 
before she acts. This is consistent with our experimental setup in which traders can cancel their 
own orders.  Traders then update their beliefs based upon the event, and the program moves to the 
next iteration and restarts the process by randomly selecting a trader.  The simulation finishes once 
30 transactions have been made or 10,000 iterations have been completed.  
The following table provides support for the model’s prediction that reflective traders will earn 
more than non-reflective traders. We utilize a stopping criterion of 30 transactions though the 
results are robust to alternate criteria (e.g., 5 transactions). 
Table B2. Ending wealth for reflective and non-reflective traders in both treatments. 
 50% fully informed 100% partially informed 
𝛼𝛼 Reflective Non-reflective Reflective Non-reflective 
1/12 2,555.69  2,211.30  2,676.36  2,200.33  
2/12 2,479.25  2,192.15  2,627.51  2,162.50  
3/12 2,414.81  2,181.73  2,582.44  2,125.85  
4/12 2,361.38  2,179.31  2,538.15  2,090.93  
5/12 2,320.05  2,182.82  2,489.64  2,061.68  
6/12 2,290.45  2,189.55  2,437.04  2,042.96  
7/12 2,269.84  2,198.23  2,376.95  2,048.27  
8/12 2,256.99  2,206.02  2,314.99  2,090.02  
9/12 2,249.09  2,212.72  2,273.92  2,138.23  
10/12 2,244.53  2,217.36  2,254.20  2,168.98  
11/12 2,241.73  2,220.93  2,244.79  2,187.26  
1 2,240.00  na 2,240.00  na 
 
Appendix C. Robustness checks simulations 
C1. Stress tests of the model 
To test the robustness of Conjecture 1, we ran additional simulations of our model varying (1) the 
number of traders, (2) the traders’ initial endowments, and (3) the asset values and probabilities.  
                                                            
36 Any action by the trader (either acceptance of the current best bid/ask or submission of a new bid and ask) is 
conditional upon the trader’s finances.  That is, a trader may only submit a new bid (accept the best ask) if she has 
enough cash to cover the new bid (accepted ask) plus all of her outstanding bids.  Similarly, the trader may only submit 
a new ask (accept the best bid) if she has enough shares to cover the new ask (accepted bid) plus all of her outstanding 
asks. 
46 
 
Analogous to Figure C1, the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value averaged across 
25,000 simulations for each asset value is reported in Table C1.  Consistent with Conjecture 1b, we 
report that markets in which private information is concentrated (50% fully informed) leads to lower 
MAD values than markets in which information is dispersed (100% partially informed). 
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C2. Allocative efficiency 
 
 
 
Table C1.- This table reports the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value.  The reported value 
corresponds to the average across 25,000 simulations for each asset value (50, 240 and 490) and value of 𝛼𝛼. 
 
Market with twice the 
number of traders 
[1] 
Market with three times more 
cash and shares 
[2] 
Market with uniform 
distribution of market value 
[3] 
Asset Values 
 
50-240-490 
 
50-240-490 
 
100-200-300 
 
Probabilities 
 
0.35-0.45-0.20 
 
0.35-0.45-0.20 
 
1/3-1/3-1/3 
 
Endowment 1,200 francs, 4 shares  3,600 francs, 12 shares 1,200 francs, 4 shares 
Number of 
traders 24 traders 12 traders 12 traders 
 MAD  
𝛼𝛼 
100% 
partially 
informed 
50% fully 
informed 
100% 
partially 
informed 
50% fully 
informed 
100% 
partially 
informed 
50% fully 
informed 
0 148.81 94.26 137.25 88.67 62.84 35.67 
1/24 147.24 85.37     
2/24 (1/12) 145.27 76.32 131.59 70.96 58.75 28.47 
3/24 142.86 67.50     
4/24 (2/12) 139.85 59.56 125.27 55.26  53.92 22.32 
5/24 136.21 51.77     
6/24 (3/12) 132.06 44.31 116.55 42.19  48.80 17.08 
7/24 127.21 38.12     
8/24 (4/12) 121.79 32.41 103.91 31.54 43.49 12.94 
9/24 115.75 27.29     
10/24 (5/12) 109.30 23.10 86.91 23.14 36.61 9.58 
11/24 102.43 19.31     
12/24 (6/12) 95.30 16.23 67.43 16.96 28.40 6.98 
13/24 87.92 13.73     
14/24 (7/12) 79.85 11.78 48.44 12.47 20.71 5.27 
15/24 72.22 10.10     
16/24 (8/12) 64.47 8.88 33.07 9.35 15.42 3.93 
17/24 57.40 7.85     
18/24 (9/12) 51.90 7.09 22.62 7.21 10.48 3.10 
19/24 46.11 6.49     
20/24 (10/12) 41.54 5.89 16.33 5.94 7.95 2.53 
21/24 37.40 5.42     
22/24 (11/12) 33.35 5.03 12.35 5.04 5.07 2.12 
23/24 28.98 4.73     
1 22.18 4.44 8.99 4.40 6.33 1.95 
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We use simulations to assess the effect of concentrating information in the hands of insiders in lieu 
of distributing evenly across traders on the allocative efficiency of markets (see Conjecture 1b). To 
that end, we simulate markets in which the value of the asset differs across traders (see Plott and 
Sunder 1988, Series A). In particular, we consider three possible states of the world denoted X, Y 
and Z.  In state X (Y) [Z], the asset value is equal to 100 (240) [300] francs for one-half of the traders 
and 290 (190) [160] for the other half (see Corgnet et al. 2018b). In these private values simulations, 
we used the same trading rules and number of traders as in the main treatments with the exception 
that traders were endowed with 1,500 francs and 3 shares of the asset.   
To measure the allocative efficiency of a market, we follow Plott and Sunder (1988) and Corgnet 
et al. (2018b) by comparing the sum of asset payouts received by all traders in a given market (Actual 
Payouts) with the payouts which would have been made if traders knew the state of the world (Max 
Payouts).  More specifically, we assess the extent to which a market allocation of shares improves 
upon the no-trade allocation. We then calculate our efficiency measure as: Allocative Efficiency ≔
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃˗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃˗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , where the No-trade Payouts are those obtained by traders when they 
keep their initial portfolio (without making a trade). Below, we represent the average allocative 
efficiency (across all possible proportions of reflective traders in the market) for markets with 100% 
partially informed traders and for markets with 50% fully informed traders. We show that allocative 
efficiency is higher when the market is populated by fully informed traders rather when the market 
is only populated by partially informed traders. 
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Figure C1. Allocative efficiency simulations for markets with 100% partially informed traders 
and for markets with 50% fully informed. 
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Appendix D. Survey 
Cognitive reflection test (CRT) (5 minutes) 
Taken from Frederick (2005): 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ____ cents 
[Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents] 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes 
[Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes] 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? ____ days 
[Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days] 
Taken from Toplak et al. (2014):  
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 
12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days  
[correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9] 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many 
students are in the class? ______ students  
[correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30]  
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. 
How much has he made? _____ dollars 
[correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10]  
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after 
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for 
Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this 
point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has 
lost money 
[correct answer: c; intuitive response: b] 
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Theory of the mind Test (10 minutes) 
This is an example of the 36 questions in the test of Baron-Cohen et al. (1997): 
 
Figure D1. Example of an eye gaze test question 
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Appendix E. Market figures 
 
The average price per market period is listed at the top of each subfigure, and the true asset value is 
denoted at the bottom of each subfigure. Each transaction is denoted by a red dot. The rational 
expectations value is indicated by a horizontal line, and the Walrasian model value is indicated by a 
dashed line.  
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Figure 1.1. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 1. Figure 1.3. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 3. 
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Figure 1.2. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 2. Figure 1.4. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 4. 
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Figure 1.5. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 5. Figure 1.7. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 7. 
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Figure 1.6. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 6. Figure 1.8. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 8. 
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Figure 1.9. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 9. Figure 1.10. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 10.
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Figure 1.11. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 1. 
 
Figure 1.13. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 3. 
 
Figure 1.12. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 2. 
 
Figure 1.14. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 4. 
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Figure 1.15. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 5. 
 
Figure 1.17. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 7. 
 
 
Figure 1.16. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 6. 
 
Figure 1.18. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 8. 
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Figure 1.19. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 9. 
Figure 1.21. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.20. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 10. 
Figure 1.22. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 2. 
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Figure 1.23. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 3. 
Figure 1.25. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 5. 
Figure 1.24. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 4
Figure 1.26. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 1. 
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Figure 1.27. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 2. 
Figure 1.29. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 4. 
 
Figure 1.28. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 3. 
Figure 1.30. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 5. 
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Figure 1.31. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 1. 
Figure 1.33. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 4. 
Figure 1.32. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 2. 
Figure 1.34. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 4. 
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Figure 1.35. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 5. 
 
Figure 1.37. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’ 
Session 2. 
 
Figure 1.36. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’ 
Session 1. 
 
Figure 1.38. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’ 
Session 3. 
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Figure 1.39. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’ 
Session 4. 
 
Figure 1.40. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’ 
Session 5. 
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Appendix O1. Instructions (online appendix) 
We display the screenshots for the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment. 
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